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Abstract
Corruption has gained attention around the world as a prominent issue. This is because
corruption has greatly affected several countries. Following the exploration of various definitions
and types of corruption, this thesis focuses on two efforts to rein in “grand corruption”, also known
as executive corruption. The thesis is informed by existing theories of corruption as well as anticorruption agencies and then situates Peru’s experience with corruption in its theoretical context
and its broader Latin American context. This work conducts a comparative analysis and follows a
process-tracing approach to examine and evaluate Peru’s recent anti-corruption agencies and their
effectiveness in holding politically powerful people to account. An analysis is made regarding the
efforts of two presidents who claimed to be committed to battling corruption; however, each had
different motivations and operated under different circumstances. These differences were
showcased in the following influential pillars: institutional design, funding, and oversight within
the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CNA) and the Superior Court of Justice Specialized in
Organized Crime and Corruption (CSJ).
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INTRODUCTION

On March of 2018, the President of Peru, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski stepped down from office
after he was implicated in a corruption scandal that had plagued the previous five presidencies
(Shiel & Chavkin 2019). This scandal involved illicit payments made to executive officials by the
Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht. Kuczynski was not the first high-ranked official to
step down as a result of their involvement. The Odebrecht scandal affected more than fourteen
countries and their elected officials (Goldstein & Drybread 2018). It was during this year that
several executives were charged with corruption crimes and that their involvement was put to light.
This soon grabbed attention from the media, placing a focus on cases of corruption across Latin
America.
The choice to study corruption within this thesis came from an interest in the
aforementioned charging of officials within the Peruvian executive. It is interesting that a
particular type of corruption spanned more than thirty years and furthermore, that the same scandal
involved not only the previous five presidents of the republic but also presidents of other countries.
Although corruption has gained attention recently, the study of its causes, the
categorization of its different forms and comprehensive studies on its solution continue to be
understudied as this is generally a new topic (Ilona Wysmułek 2015). This thesis aims to answer
some of the questions regarding how corruption takes form and under what conditions anticorruption agencies (ACAs) can be effective at holding officials accountable for their crimes.

1

Given many of the corruption cases in Peru dealing with officials in the executive have
been handled by the same anti-corruption agency, it is possible to ask the question: Is the new anticorruption agency more effective than the previous one? This paper takes from theories of grand
corruption (corrupt acts committed by political elites to benefit a few at the expense of many) to
help answer this question.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
An Introduction to Corruption
Corruption is a universal practice pervasive in societies around the world. But corrupt
practices are not new, in fact, scholars have been documenting acts of corruption since colonial
times. Moreno-Cebrián and Sala i Vila, use historical accounts from the 15th and 16th century to
paint an overall picture of what corruption looked like in its early days (Quiroz 2008). Other
academics focus on modern corruption and the trajectories of countries that have dealt with the
corruption over time, analyzing modern successful cases of good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi
2013).
Through the work of many scholars we have learned that most modern democracies have
been able to transform their societies and reduce corruption by shifting from patrimonialism to
ethical universalism, that is, a government’s application of equal and fair treatment for everyone
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2016, 95). Modern cases of good governance include Denmark and Britain,
where Denmark had a bureaucracy that was decently paid and selected on merit (before the nation
even democratized) and Britain established a Parliament and local civil society that fostered public
integrity (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, 1274). The exact reason behind these successes is hard to
determine, however, some scholars believe it is largely due to the strength of a country’s
institutions. These scholars believe that institutions such as a fairly elected legislature, an honest
executive, and an independent and accountable judicial system are key to imposing accountability
measures and have even developed frameworks for these institutional strengths (Pope 2000).
3

Others, however, place more emphasis on a government’s willingness to fight corruption
through institutions. Scholars, such as Mungiu-Pippidi claim that “oversight bodies work only if
the government itself is not an extractive pyramid surviving on the spoliation of public resources—
in other words, if control of corruption is already built” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, 1281). This
prompts the question: can the strengthening of institutions increase accountability and enhance the
fight against corruption? This can be addressed by using the case of Peru, a country which
coincidentally has recently had two different anti-corruption institutions with clear differences in
their oversight (among others).
Definitions of Corruption
Corruption takes many different forms, which makes it difficult to define what exactly
corruption is and how it can be measured. However, it must be noted that simply because
corruption is pervasive and takes different forms, does not mean it cannot be defined. The term
corruption has been defined differently by several scholars. For example, Graycar gives the
definition of corruption when applied to the civil servant, while Mistree and Dibley define it more
generally as an event that occurs when an actor seeks an unauthorized benefit from an organization
in a manner that could compromise the public's trust (Mistree & Dibley 2018; Graycar 2015). On
a different note, Mungiu-Pippidi champions the argument that corruption is ubiquitous, as it takes
on different forms across societies according to “power distribution, natural resources and societal
constraints” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2017, 2). Mungiu-Pippidi therefore defines corruption in general as
‘deviation’ from the norm of integrity,1 though it must be made clear that according to Mungiu-

Pippidi’s definition is referring more specifically, to a country’s formal norms of integrity as opposed to informal
ones.
1
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Pippidi, both today as well as in the past, corruption for the most part is an intrinsic part of a certain
governance context (Mungiu-Pippidi 2017, 5).
Here I use Joseph Nye’s 1967 definition of corruption which defines the act as “a violation
of the norms of public office for personal gain” (J. Nye 1967, 419). This definition denotes specific
behavior that is generally called corrupt by Western standards which “are partly relevant in most
developing countries” (Nye 1967, 419). But not all scholars agree with this definition. Some
scholars criticize Nye’s definition of corruption for having several “terminological shortcomings”
and failing to capture the “complex nature of the acts that are associated with corruption and the
various motivations as to why actors carry out such acts” (Mistree & Dibley 2018, 4). These
arguments can be countered however, because as Nye explains, the purpose of having a narrow
definition of corruption is that it stops the term from being more relevant to moral evaluation than
political analysis. This means that by using this definition scholars are prevented from analyzing
the personal motivations behind corrupt acts and instead allows them to study the structural reasons
for why they occur. In short, this definition is more straightforward and focuses more on the how
as opposed to the why.
It is possible to conclude that although there are several different definitions of corruption,
this thesis will use Joseph Nye’s definition in order to focus on under what conditions or through
which mechanisms elite officials within the executive were able to commit such acts.
Types of Corruption
Scholars have also concluded that there are three general types of corruption that stand out
as they tend to occur most often (Morris 2011; Mistree & Dibley 2018; Graycar 2017). These are:
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grand, legislative, and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to the abuse of power by political
elites that benefits a few at the expense of many (Barrett & Fazekas 2019, 2). This would be
equivalent to a president trading favors in exchange for campaign financing. Legislative corruption
entails corrupt behavior associated with legislators (Morris 2011, 11); most of the time this deals
with vote buying. The last type of corruption, petty corruption, takes place at the micro-level and
involves smaller, routine payments (Morris 2011, 11). An example of this is seen in Costa Rica,
whereby small under-the-table bribes (commonly known in Costa Rica as Biombos) are often
given to medical staff at hospitals to reduce patient waiting time (Lewis 2006; Wilson 2014).
This thesis focuses on the subset of corruption known as “grand corruption.” Grand
corruption as noted earlier has been defined as a type of corruption where “political elites allocate
state resources in exchange for political support” (Barrett & Fazekas 2019, 2). Regardless of the
definition however, grand corruption usually deals with officials within the executive. The
executive is the focus of analysis because of the effects leaders have on corruption via their policymaking and the influence they have over government institutions (Budd 2003, 42). This is reflected
in Peru’s case, whereby the President’s power over anti-corruption institutions has been
historically dominant and responsible for how corruption has been dealt with. Furthermore, grand
corruption was chosen given the past five Peruvian presidents have been involved in large-scale
corruption cases.
Why Do We Study Corruption?
Why is it important to study grand corruption? Because of the several impacts it has on a
society. Some common examples include grafting, vote-buying, and extortion, with the effects
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often being a decline in levels of democracy, public trust and economic growth. It must be noted
that not all scholars see corruption as negative. Scholars studying this topic constantly debate on
how to weigh the effects that often come from such practices. For example, Pozsgai-Alvarez,
Mungiu-Pippidi, Wilson, and several other scholars agree that corrupt practices are detrimental as
they often lead to unethical outcomes and power inequality. The logic behind this argument is that
when influence is distributed unevenly, the result is “constant preferential treatment of certain
groups by the state, with real power being held by the same individuals or networks regardless of
the outcome of elections” (Mungiu-Pippidi & Johnson 2017, 10). Sen and Saha directly refute this
however, claiming that corruption is not exclusively negative, as it can allow for greater economic
freedom which leads to investment and growth (Sen & Saha 2019). It is argued that this is true
because corruption has the potential to increase investment and annual growth within strong
authoritarian regimes, as these types of governments often give firms confidence that the ruling
powers will deliver on the deals that they have entered. Furthermore, these scholars argue that the
overall effects of democracy on economic growth tend to be weakly negative (Tavares & Wacziarg
2001). Sen and Saha do recognize that the effects of corruption on economic growth varies based
on the levels of democracy a country has.
With Peru’s case, it has been demonstrated that corruption was not positive for the
economy. For example, former President Alan Garcia put Peru under one of the worst economic
depressions in the country’s history and his political ties to elites as well as his involvement in
several illicit enrichment acts such as the received bribes of more than US $100 million for foiling
the purchase of 26 Mirage aircrafts or those received from the International Bank of Credit and
Commerce did not aid the situation (Pastor & Wise 1992; Semana Económica 2016; El Comercio
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2019). According to the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, Garcia’s first term suffered hyperinflation
of 2,775%. Although Garcia conducted a plan to control inflation by nationalizing private
industries, by the end of his administration, he had left his country with significantly higher
inflation rates than with which he had received it (Paredes & Sachs 1991). The World Bank also
refutes the claim that corruption is good for the economy as it demonstrates that in 2001, the
biggest obstacle to doing business in Peru was corruption (World Bank 2003). As shown in Figure
1, the World Bank’s interview concluded that “more than 85% of managers of enterprises rated
corruption as the most serious problem they face” (World Bank 2003).

8

Figure 1: Perceived Level of Corruption In Selected Agencies

(Bank, PERCEIVED LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN SELECTED AGENCIES, 2003)
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Anti-Corruption Agencies
It is important to understand the basic concepts of corruption as well as the principles that
make anti-corruption agencies effective before analyzing the specific cases found in Latin America
and Peru. There are three institutional pillars that influence the effectiveness of anti-corruption
agencies (ACAs). As has been mentioned throughout this study, these three pillars are the
oversight, institutional design, and funding mechanisms. Similarly, Dixit (2016) discusses these
pillars in more detail, describing them as: 1. Political support from a country’s leader and his/her
appointment of a good head for the agency 2. A clear and comprehensive framework that delineates
its powers and relationships with other agencies. 3. Adequate resources and independence (Dixit
2016, 16).
According to a public policy research program from Princeton University (which looked
at the ACAs of eight countries), four key lessons were learned in relevance to the three institutional
pillars. In these lessons we can recognize a relationship between them (Dixit 2016). For example,
a strong leadership that imposes internal controls and works with accountability mechanisms, plays
an important role in preserving integrity and keeping anti-corruption agencies from being
subverted. Additionally, ACAs can be effective by building alliances with civil society, other state
institutions, and the media to bypass their opposers. Furthermore, preventive efforts that work to
disrupt corruption networks combined with educational efforts to reshape norms, help to make
long-term gains. Finally, another key finding points out that timing is key in the success of ACAs.
This is because “under certain conditions, ACAs pursuing high-level corruption can overcome
retaliation by carefully managing timing, resources, and external support” (Dixit 2016, 17). These
concepts are important in order to trace the process and dynamics of two Peruvian ACAs, which
help to understand why one of the institutions succeeded while the other did not.
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Causes of Corruption in Latin America
In Latin America, most countries score high in corruption indexes (Transparency International
2018). According to Asamoah, corruption on a macro-level is widespread in developing countries
because conditions are strong for it and the motivation to earn income is “extremely strong due to:
poverty, low salaries, high risks of all kinds, (illness, accidents and unemployment, lack of
insurance) etc. making opportunities to engage in corruption more numerous” (Asamoah 2017, 4).
Goldstein and Drybread on the other hand, claim that some forms of corruption such as the one
seen in Argentina or Colombia’s Monteria region, are based on regional characteristics of
inequality and the country’s historically constituted hierarchies of class and race (Goldstein &
Drybread 2018, 309). With regards to corruption within the executive, some scholars claim
politicians take part in corrupt practices in order to achieve private gains and because the “strategic
allocation of state resources buys loyalty, which in turn helps them consolidate their power and
gain an advantage over their political competitors” (Barrett & Fazekas 2019, 2). Furthermore, other
scholars and this paper claim that executive corruption arises out of a lack of strong institutions
which generally serve to expose politicians and provide accountability (Goldstein & Drybread
2018, 303).
Irrespective of the cause, executive corruption has been exemplified in real cases
throughout Latin America (Goldstein & Drybread 2018, 303). Furthermore, the above arguments
serve to make apparent one assertion: institutions are very influential in controlling grand
corruption. Goldstein and Drybread support this claim as they explain that the most infamous
corruption investigations and crackdowns on corruption in Latin America (such as those including
the former Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina, former Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff,
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and former Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) were successful because of
maturing legal institutions that held a high level of scrutiny and accountability (Goldstein &
Drybread 2018, 303).
The Lava Jato Case
The Lava Jato case supports the importance of studying corruption as officials have not
only taken money from foreign companies in exchange for personal monetary gains, but also
interfered with the democratic institutions of their respective countries and taken advantage of the
public’s trust in doing so.
On 2014, Brazil’s federal police launched Operation Lava Jato (also known as Operation
Car Wash). The case began as a minor investigation on money laundering schemes but soon
became a bigger inquiry that has since exposed officials in more than fourteen Latin American
countries for taking millions of dollars in bribes from the Brazilian construction company,
Odebrecht, in exchange for infrastructure contracts.
Scholars are currently debating on what exactly allowed for the Lava Jato investigation to
succeed at holding individuals accountable for their crimes. For example, according to researchers
from the Wilson Center’s Brazil Institute, Judge Sergio Moro was an integral part of the
investigation (Wilson Center 2016). These scholars explain that Moro kept guilty individuals in
jail before their trials, something unheard of for Brazil’s wealthy elite. During this time, Moro
gave them a plea bargain whereby if they gave out the names of who they were working with, they
would receive shorter sentences. This is how high-end executives and eventually politicians from
more than fourteen Latin American countries became entangled in the investigation (Shiel &
Chavkin 2019). Other scholars disagree with this line of reasoning and have denounced the
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investigation itself as corrupt. Francisco Celso-Calmon explains that Moro targeted former
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, in order to remove him from Brazil’s 2018 election.
Furthermore, Celso-Calmon points out that it was strange that “Judge Moro allocated about 50
pages of the total of 238 of his decision, to talk about himself and defend his opinion” and calls
this a “kind of self-defeating sentence” (Celso-Calmon 2018, 54). Similarly, Ricardo Lodi-Ribeiro
calls the entire investigation a striking case of lawfare (a portmanteau of law and warfare), used
by Moro to harass his political adversaries, while Lenio Luiz-Streck describes it as a case with an
explosive combination of a “biased judge, biased prosecutor and free assessment of evidence”
(Lodi-Ribeiro 2018; Luiz-Streck 2018). Celso-Calmon argues that by subverting the law (by taking
part in improper practices such as phone tappings) and having not followed the proper rules of
conduct within the investigation, Moro has damaged the institutions of Brazil and made it more
likely for the country to become tyrannical.
However, it can be argued that Celso-Calmon is exaggerating the effects that Operation
Lava Jato has had on the democratic state. This is seen within his writing, where the Marxist
scholar calls Moro an “illusionist forced to present constant surprises to keep the eyes of the
audience fixed on him” and refers to those working on the investigation as Moro’s “minions that
carry out a new blow to law and democracy every day” (Celso-Calmon 2018, 53). Furthermore,
Celso-Calmon claims that “there is no proof of the crimes of corruption and money laundering”,
yet this was recently proven wrong, as reports have found concrete evidence of participation in
money laundering not only by Lula but by dozens of other politicians within Latin America,
including Peru (Celso-Calmon 2018, 54; Goldstein & Drybread 2018).
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It must be noted that although the Lava Jato investigation brought corruption news to light,
not all Latin American countries reformed their accountability agencies. In contrast to other
countries in the region, Peru has given more extensive penalties to those involved with the
corruption scandal. For example, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, Argentinian officials
were paid at least $35 million in bribes by Odebrecht in exchange for contracts (Shiel & Chavkin
2019). Despite the concrete evidence however, until recently, the courts have been relaxed and
have failed to hold officials accountable over the Odebrecht scandal. Those implicated within the
investigation include a former vice president, a former public works minister, and former
Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who were in office from 20032007 and 2007-2015, respectively (Gedan & Phalen 2018). According to Benjamin Gedan and
Daniel Alonso, the lack of action can be explained because of Argentina’s weak institutions, for
example, its criminal justice system (Americas Quarterly 2018). Other scholars predict “judges,
prosecutors, lawmakers and even anticorruption crusaders” have not taken action in order to
protect political allies (Americas Quarterly 2018).
In contrast, Peru has charged several officials with corruption crimes and has held a
majority of those charged accountable, as seen with most of the former presidents (Americas
Quarterly 2018). This is greatly owed to the reforming of institutions by former President Pedro
Pablo Kuczynski and his decree N.° 1307, which created the Superior Court of Justice Specialized
in Organized Crime and Corruption (El Peruano 2018). This court is significant, as it has been
responsible for helping charge three presidents as well as several other officials for their crimes.2

Such as former Congresswoman Keiko Fujimori, who is currently accused of money laundering (Corte Superior
De Justicia Especializada En Delitos De Crimen Organizado Y Corrupción De Funcionarios 2018).
2
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It can be concluded that the Lava Jato case was crucial for the connected crimes of
corruption to surface. This investigation has not only shed light on these cases but has also brought
about discussions on reforms to curb corruption, pushing governments to put in place mechanisms
that deal with such crimes. Though as mentioned earlier, not all countries have made the attempt
to make changes or put in place measures that provide accountability. Furthermore, the Lava Jato
investigation has also served to provide a contextual narrative of what grand corruption currently
looks like throughout Latin America.
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GRAND CORRUPTION IN PERU

The following is a brief analysis of corruption scandals that surrounded the presidents in
power shortly before and after the creation of Peru’s two major anti-corruption programs. These
presidents and their actions are significant in the upcoming analysis of anti-corruption institutions
as their administrations played important roles in shaping the conditions under which the
institutions were put in place.
1990-2000: Alberto Fujimori
Alberto Fujimori was involved in perhaps the most infamous case of corruption within
Peru’s numerous corruption scandals. Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, was elected to the
presidency at a time when Peru was plagued by pervasive poverty, inflation, nearly depleted
foreign reserves, a growing narcotics trade, and two growing terrorist groups: the Tupac Amarú
Revolutionary Movement and the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) (Calderón Bentin 2018).
Although Fujimori began his term as any other president, looking to resolve the nation’s
problems with reforms and structural changes to the system, two weeks after taking office, he
imposed a series of harsh measures known as “Fujishocks” meant to decrease the country’s
inflation. One such measure included the raising of gasoline prices by 3,000 percent (Pastor 2019,
136). Manuel Pastor explains that this action had mixed reactions as it went against his promised
gradualist approach to inflation-fighting and hurt the poor yet stimulated economic growth.
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Two years into his presidency, Fujimori found it hard to work with congress as he lacked
a majority, and therefore in April of 1992, he instituted a self-coup3 which dissolved congress and
suspended the constitution. In addition to this, he created death squads, removed the judiciary by
taking out 13 out of the 23 Supreme Court Justices, and introduced a law of “authentic
interpretation” that essentially gave him the power to interpret the Constitution. He used this to
interpret the constitution’s two-term limit to mean that it only counted after his first term, which
allowed allowing him to run for a third term in 2000 (Crabtree 2006, 298).
Fujimori claimed this was done in order to effectively root out corruption and combat
terrorism in Peru (Calderón Bentin 2018). However, shortly after, the Peruvian public was
surprised by the famous “Vladi-videos”, a series of videos (approximately 2,400 tapes) that
showed Fujimori’s right-hand man and chief advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos bribing members of
congress with cash to support Fujimori’s policies. The most famous of these videos shows
Montesinos as he placed $15,000 in cash on a table in an attempt to bribe Congressman Luis
Alberto Kouri into supporting Fujimori’s upcoming presidential campaign (Coyne & Leeson 2009,
1). These events sparked an investigation into allegations that Montesinos had been laundering
money through Swiss banks. The evidence showed that he had illegally misallocated around $800
million (Martin 2017).
Following the investigation, Fujimori unexpectedly traveled to Japan for a summit, and
three days later he faxed his resignation to Congress (Quiroz 2008). Due to his double citizenship,
and Japan’s lack of an extradition treaty with Peru, Fujimori was able to remain in Japan. In June

3

Known in Peru as an autogolpe (Quiroz 2008).
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of 2001, Montesinos was arrested in Venezuela after attempting to withdraw some of the $38
million he had in a bank account in Miami (Feinstein 2001). In 2006, Fujimori traveled to Chile
and was arrested upon arrival and subsequently sent to Peru where he was charged with corruption,
human rights violations, kidnapping, and murder (Transparency International 2005).
While some scholars argue that Fujimori fits the definition of a neo-populist leader, others
claim he is a classic example of authoritarian rule (Crabtree 2001). Some scholars have combined
the two claims, describing the former president’s regime as a hybrid or “an admixture of
democratic and autocratic elements” (Crabtree 2001, 287). Regardless of which definition he falls
under, most scholars would agree that Fujimori’s presidency was characterized by the
consolidation of power within the executive and his taking of advantage of weak institutions and
political parties.
Fujimori’s actions support the hypothesis of this study as it reveals the importance of
having strong institutions and the consequences of a lack thereof. In this case, Fujimori dissolved
congress, changed the constitution, and weakened institutions on order to have his policies passed.
Successful anti-corruption institutions were seen for the first-time during Alejandro Toledo’s
presidency.
2001-2006: Alejandro Toledo
Following Fujimori’s term, Alejandro Toledo (Peru Posible party) took office on July of
2001. Toledo distanced himself from Fujimori by having an anti-corruption platform, focusing on
accountability, job creation, and helping the working-class. Toledo used his indigenous
background and achievements to reinforce the idea that this was possible (Greene 2007). Once his
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presidency began, his promises fell flat (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018). For example, the economy
remained stable following Fujimori’s term, however, other issues such as corruption resurfaced.
Several scholars point out that Toledo did not focus on fighting corruption as much as he focused
on the economic state of the country, and even then, he failed to create enough jobs to significantly
decrease poverty (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018).
Despite his promise to diminish corruption, Toledo’s attempts to crack down on the issue
were insignificant. Furthermore, towards the end of his presidency it was discovered that not only
had Toledo committed corrupt acts himself, but he had dismantled the institution he created that
focused on keeping corruption levels down and enforcing accountability measures within Peruvian
politics (Cervantes-Bautista 2019).
While at first glance these offenses might seem trivial in comparison with those of
Fujimori’s, years later in 2016, Toledo was accused of taking more than $20 millions in bribes
from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht (La Republica 2017). This was uncovered by
Operation Lava Jato (Also known as Operation Car Wash), an ongoing investigation conducted by
the Federal police of Brazil into the corrupt acts of a Brazilian company that had numerous
construction contracts across Latin America. According to the operation, Odebrecht paid Toledo
millions in exchange for a guaranteed profitable highway-building contract during his term
(Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project 2019). Toledo was arrested on July of 2019
in California and is currently facing extradition from the United States.
In the years that followed, grand corruption acts stayed relatively on a par with those of the
Toledo administration. Each president after him becoming involved with the Odebrecht company.
It was not until Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the presidency in 2016 that anti-corruption reforms
were given an emphasis again.
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2016-2018: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (also known as PPK) began his presidency on unsteady ground.
Kuczynski’s first 100 days were plagued with corruption charges involving several members of
his administration. PPK’s health advisor, Carlos Moreno, was the first member accused of
corruption after he was recorded trying to negotiate corrupt deals with the administrators of
clinics4, calling the agreement a “gold mine” (Americas Society and Council of the Americas
2016). Next, his Deputy Agriculture Minister, Juan Carlos Gonzáles, was charged with favoring a
private company to take care of nutritional school programs in exchange for more than $680,000
(RPP 2016).
As a result, PPK released a series of anti-corruption measures. This included five anticorruption policies: 1. A comprehensive review of the presidential office and the parameters
involved in choosing advisors, 2. Ministers will evaluate their environment, 3. “Civil
death” barring employees convicted of corruption from ever returning to a state job, 4. The
creation of a council of state that works with congress and the judiciary in overseeing the fight
against corruption within government institutions, 5. The creation of a presidential integrity
commission (WALAC 2016).
In an ironic twist of events however, Kuczynski himself was charged with corruption by
the organized Crimes Division of the Superior Court, a program created by a decree (N.° 1307) that
Kuczynski himself sponsored and signed into law (El Peruano). Much like the previous presidents,
PPK was accused of having ties to Odebrecht during his days as Minister of Economy, helping the
Brazilian company score contracts. In return for these favors, Odebrecht would deposit funds into

4

Called “patients-for-money” deals (Americas Society and Council of the Americas 2016).
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accounts managed by a consulting firm co-owned by Kuczynski. The investigation that followed
prompted for an impeachment vote; however, the impeachment request was rejected by congress
as there was insufficient evidence of his involvement as well as a necessary number of votes
(Global Americans 2018).
After another corruption scandal broke out, a second impeachment vote was initiated by
the opposition. In a desperate attempt to stay in power, Kuczynski secretly sought help from the
opposition party, Popular Force, (composed mainly of Fujimori supporters) and negotiated with
Congressman Kenji Fujimori for the necessary votes to block the impeachment (OCCRP 2018).
This was done in exchange for a presidential pardon to Kenji’s father, former president Alberto
Fujimori, who was serving a 25-year sentence for corruption and crimes against humanity (Global
Americans 2018).
Hours before the vote however, Congressman Moisés Mamani, released videos of the
compromising meetings in which PPK discussed the bribes promised to members of congress in
exchange for votes against impeachment (El Espectador 2018). The releasing of these videos
worsened PPK’s on-going corruption investigation and solidified the results of his second
impeachment, forcing him to resign shortly after. This paper argues that it was the institutions
created during Kuczynski’s term (such as decree N.° 1307) that significantly helped implicate
officials and political leaders in the Odebrecht scandal.
Additionally, it is imperative to recognize that Operation Car Wash is a root cause for why
many Latin American presidents have become entangled and held accountable for their crimes.
What began as a minor investigation by the Brazilian federal police on money laundering schemes,
grew into a bigger inquiry that has exposed the largest ever corruption scandal in Latin America.
These findings in combination with the anti-corruption measures passed by the Kuczynski
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administration culminated in stronger accountability agencies and the exposure of corruption
within Peru’s executive branch.
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HYPOTHESIS

H1: The anti-corruption agencies of Peru today are more effective at holding elected
officials accountable than those of previous administrations.
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METHODOLOGY

This study began with exploratory research, as the topic of corruption is very broad and
often a highly ambiguous situation. Through exploratory methods, the scope of the work was
narrowed down. Through a comparative analysis and a process tracing approach, this study aims
to determine the differences between anti-corruption institutions and how they affect the
accountability of officials within the executive branch.
The accountability of anti-corruption institutions has been determined based on
observations. The strength of anti-corruption institutions is measured using a compilation of
studies and reports that point out judicial effectiveness (as well as government integrity within
institutions). By taking into account the different anti-corruption measures generated by the CNA
and the CSJ, judicial effectiveness can be observed based on the number and the rank of the
executive officials charged with preventive arrests.
In order to give context with regards to how grand corruption operates in Peru, the
presidencies of Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski were studied.
These particular presidents were chosen given they shaped the political climate of Peru during
their terms and accordingly, its corruption levels. Fujimori set the conditions and need for anticorruption agencies while the Toledo and Kuczynski presidencies were crucial to the creation of
the CNA and the CSJ.
Although the two presidencies created the institutions under different circumstances, the
two aforementioned institutions are studied in detail with regards to their design, their financing
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and the quality of their oversight which are theoretically seen as determining factors for an anticorruption agency’s effectiveness.
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PERU’S FIRST ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM
The CNA: National Anti-Corruption Commission
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (CNA) was established under Supreme Decree
No. 120- 2001-PCM during Alejandro Toledo’s presidency. Prior to the CNA, there had been few
initiatives to curb corruption, though some did exist. For example, Valentin Paniagua (in office
from 2000-2001), of the Acción Popular Party, instituted the National Anti-Corruption Initiative
(INA) after taking office as interim president shortly after Fujimori and his two vice presidents
resigned5 (Feinstein 2001). The INA attempted to address these issues by encouraging discussions
and proposals of anti-corruption policies. However, it was only after Toledo created the CNA as
well as the anti-corruption czar position in 2001 that Peru finally saw the creation of a formal anticorruption institution (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 7).
Although there is little literature on Toledo’s work against corruption, scholars tend to
agree on why the CNA was created. Most argue that the institution was created in part because of
pressure and expectations from civil society actors (such as international forces and NGOs) that
demanded Toledo decrease Peru’s corruption levels following the Fujimori presidency (PozsgaiAlvarez 2018; Crabtree 2006). The CNA was meant to investigate the illicit enrichment, drug

The purpose of the INA was to address the rampant corruption that was unveiled during the Fujimori presidency as
well as the constitutional and human rights violations that occurred during those years (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018).
5
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trafficking and money laundering of the previous governments (Valenzuela 2001). This chapter
will go over the CNA’s institutional design, its financing mechanism, and its oversight.
The CNA’s Design
The CNA was poorly designed to work hand-in-hand with the anti-corruption Czar. This
is because as anecdotal evidence reveals, the Czar himself was appointed based on patronage and
the program lacked formal guidelines to follow (Center for Public Impact 2018; Pozsgai-Alvarez
2018). According to a personal interview conducted by Pozsgai-Alvarez, both a staff member of
the CNA and a former senior official of the Association of Lawyers of Lima explain that the Czar
that Toledo picked, Martin Belaunde Moreyra, was appointed head of the CNA in order to return
a favor (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018). According to these sources, Belaunde Moreyra was selected
because he helped Toledo during his election campaign. Some of these favors include arranging
for Toledo to speak at events hosted by the Association of Lawyers of Lima, an association headed
by Belaunde Moreyra (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 7).
Given this connection, it can be concluded that the institution itself lacked independence
from the beginning of its inception. This argument is further backed up by the fact that the Czar
himself used his power for personal gains (Cervantes-Bautista 2019). For instance, shortly after
beginning his position, Belaunde Moreyra refused to deal with cases surrounding politicians he
had good relationships with, and on several occasions “even acted as in their defense” (La
Republica 2002). Furthermore, the Czar’s pick for members to fill the institution’s commissioner
seats was composed of close friends (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 9). This was an issue not only because
of a lack of impartiality but also because some of the seats taken up were crucial for fulfilling the
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CNA’s goals. For example, three out of the four members that were supposed to represent civil
society were Belaunde Moreyra’s close friends.
Another issue with the design of the CNA was the fact that its role was never clearly
defined, and it lacked formal guidelines to follow. The INA and Ana Elena Townsend 6 condemned
the design of the CNA, recommending that the institution instead have its chair appointed by a
majority of parliament (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 9). This in return would have allowed for political
and administrative autonomy. However, the CNA did not pay particular attention to this advice
and because there was no written guideline to abide by, the Czar was able to continue appointing
underqualified individuals to these positions (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2016, 147). As a consequence,
several NGOs such as Proética, Transparency International’s anti-corruption branch in Peru,
criticized the CNA for not following the recommendations set out by the National Anti-Corruption
Initiative (INA) (Peña-Mancillas 2011). It was evident that “notwithstanding the formal power
given to the CNA, its effectiveness would be impaired if a level of independence was not
maintained” (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 9).
Financing
In addition to a weak foundation and missing guidelines, the CNA had issues regarding its
financing. This is because the CNA’s funding depended heavily on the executive (Pozsgai-Alvarez
2018, 10). Within its first year, the institution was under-funded as it lacked offices for several
employees and made many of them (including the Czar) work remotely for the first few months
(PCM 2006). Even after the CNA received funding, a budget was never set up. Furthermore, the

A member of congress who worked closely with the International Anti-Corruption Conference and who initially
but unsuccessfully proposed legislation to create an Office Against Corruption (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018, 9).
6
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amount allocated was not enough to construct offices, which forced Belaunde Moreyra to fit the
CNA employees that had been hired up to that point, in his office at the headquarters of the
Association of Lawyers of Lima (Senior Official of the Association of Lawyers of Lima 2014).
These conditions did not help in providing a successful path for the institution. Some scholars
argue that the financing issue stemmed from the fact that the CNA lacked formal procedures and
basic elements such as a budget, while others such as employees of the CNA and INA, claimed it
was due to Toledo’s lack of interest in the institution and its task to decrease corruption in politics
(Cervantes-Bautista 2019).
According to an audit report from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM), in
2002 the CNA was allocated roughly S/. 3 million soles (at the time about $1 million USD) for the
entire year (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2016). Seeing as this was a federal anti-corruption institute, the funds
seemed inadequate relative to the large task it was assigned. The amount was simply “insufficient
for the execution of its activities” (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2016, 156). Furthermore, the institution took
several months to actually operate given the first half of the budget was only transferred late in
March; for reference, the institution was created in October and had been attempting to operate
since January of 2002 without funds.
In addition, financial issues appeared to be one of the CNA’s downfalls as the funding was
cut off once the commission actually began performing its duties. Pozsgai-Alvarez explains that
although these aforementioned conditions made it hard for the CNA to crack down on corruption
cases, its commission did eventually seek institutional legitimacy, which did not please many
politicians (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018). The logic behind this is simple, by becoming involved in cases
dealing with corruption scandals, the CNA compromised the interests of many powerful
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individuals within congress and the executive. This forced Toledo (with the help of the Czar,
Belaunde Moreyra) to quickly cut the organization’s funding.
Oversight
The final issue that will be analyzed with regards to the failure of the National AntiCorruption Commission is its oversight bodies and the effect that this had on the functioning of
the CNA. Because the decree that created the commission instructed for the institution to be
presided over by the advisor of the president, that is, the anti-corruption czar, the CNA lacked the
independence that a non-biased and stand-alone institution should have. Furthermore, as
mentioned previously, its functions depended largely on how they affected the president and his
political comrades. For example, during its first year, the CNA attempted to review cases against
corrupt acts and “irregular procurements” by investigating the National Superintendent Agency
for Tax Administration (SUNAT) (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2016, 157). The CNA also attempted to open
a case against the First Lady, Eliane Karp after she was involved in a scandal with the Peruvian
bank, Wiese Sudameris. However, shortly after the CNA began investigating the issue, the first
lady resigned from the offered $10,000-a-month consulting job, as she claimed it raised
unnecessary suspicions of influence peddling and transparency (La Republica 2002). Both the
SUNAT and the Wiese investigations began to create friction between the executive and the CNA
as many politicians felt the commission was “exerting pressure over the system” (Member of the
CNA 20147). Toledo himself grew upset at the CNA for the investigation on his wife (Associated
Press 2002). Following this incident, it was evident that the commission had become “a sort of

Interviews of former workers of the CNA and the Association of Lawyers of Lima were conducted by Joseph
Pozsgai-Alvarez.
7
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enemy, or an agency that should be feared” and given the personal conflicts this posed, the
presidency “stopped providing any [further] support [for the work of the CNA]” (member of the
CNA 2014).
In 2003, the Supreme Decree No. 047-2003-PCM was published which modified the norm
that had created the CNA, thereby making it useless and effectively deactivating it (PozsgaiAlvarez 2019). The negative impacts that came out of this biased oversight are very evident, as the
CNA’s functions were undoubtedly weakened and eventually altogether stopped as soon as the
institution showed minimal signs of potential and a threat to the corrupt bureaucracy.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE SPECIALIZED IN ORGANIZED
CRIME AND CORRUPTION OF OFFICIALS
In order to understand the different outcomes of Toledo and Kuczynski’s institutions, both
must be analyzed using the same variables for comparison. Therefore, PPK’s Corte Superior de
Justicia Especializada en Delitos de Crimen y de Corrupción de Funcionarios (now known as the
Corte Superior Nacional de Justicia Penal Especializada) will be analyzed on its design, its
financing as well as its oversight bodies and how they have affected its functions. For consistency
purposes, from this point forward the court will be referred to by its former name, Corte Superior
de Justicia Especializada en Delitos de Crimen y de Corrupción de Funcionarios (CSJ for short)
given this was the name it had when it took on cases involving the former presidents.
Former President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (from the Contigo Party) won the Peruvian
presidency on July of 2016 and remained in office until March of 2018. Although the presidency
calls for the head of state to govern for five years, Kuczynski resigned from office shortly after he
was implicated in a major corruption scandal and faced an impeachment vote for the second time
over the span of two years (IDEA 2018). Despite the allegations however, Kuczynski’s short
presidency ironically focused on reducing political corruption in Peru. It was during his second
year in office that Kuczynski decided to roll out five anti-corruption measures and created the CSJ.
According to WALAC, the five measures involved: 1. An exhaustive review of the
presidential office. 2. An assessment of the environment under which ministers work, to ensure
that they have the right people and comply with their given commandments. 3. Civil death for
corrupt officials, this ensures that any officials involved in corrupt acts cannot go back to work for
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the government. 4. The creation of a council of state, convened to fight against corruption and
headed by the President of Congress, the President of the Judiciary, and the President of the
Republic. 5. The creation of a presidential integrity commission aimed at proposing legislative and
management measures to deal with corruption (WALAC 2016).
Based on these observations, the Kuczynski administration appeared to be very focused on
reducing corruption levels. However, the president himself was allegedly involved in corrupt acts,
which poses the question: What allowed for these measures and institutions to succeed when
compared to Toledo’s anti-corruption institution? As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the answer
lies in part in the design of the institution, the security of its funds received, and the institution’s
oversight bodies.
The CSJ was chosen for analysis because this institution was responsible for the
investigation and subsequent preliminary arrest of former President Kuczysnki, former President
Alan Garcia from the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party (2006-2011), and several
other politicians and officials.
The Emergence of the CSJ
The CSJ was created in 2018, through Administrative Resolution N˚138-2018-CE-PJ
(Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos 2019). The court was created as a fusion between
two institutions: the Sala Penal Nacional (Peru National Criminal Chamber) and the Sistema
Especializado en Delitos de Corrupción de Funcionarios (Specialized System for Corruption
Offenses of Officials) (El Peruano 2018). This court was created as one of Kuczynski’s anticorruption measures.
It is important to note that similar to Toledo’s case, the new president took office in 2016,
shortly after the previous presidency (headed by Ollanta Humala of Peru’s Nationalist Party) was
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heavily criticized for its involvement with the corrupt construction company mentioned earlier,
Odebrecht (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting 2017). Furthermore, Fuerza Popular
(Popular Force), the former congress-ruling opposition party, forced Kuczynski to censure both
his Education Minister Jaime Saavedra and later on Marilu Martens, as well as his Finance
Minister, Alfredo Thorne, before completely forcing his entire cabinet to resign. This came after
Kuczynski’s cabinet lost a vote of confidence over alleged corruption attempts within public
contracts (El Diario 2017). Aware of slipping approval rates and a congress controlled by the
opposition, Kuczynski followed through with his plan to reduce corruption, the same corruption
that his cabinet had been accused of (Statista 2017). Through decree N˚ 318-2018-CE-PJ published
in El Peruano on December 12, 2018, the statute of the CSJ was approved and began operating on
December 30th of the same year (El Peruano 2018).
The CSJ’s Design
The CSJ currently acts as a specialized court and has national jurisdiction that focuses on
investigating cases involving acts of corruption. The court rules over three transitory courts as well
as two appellate courts, with three judges per court (Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos
2019). At the most basic level, the CSJ is meant to investigate cases in which a corruption crime
or its effects has had national or international repercussions. The design of the CSJ is very clear.
As seen in El Peruano, the court’s duties are clearly outlined and the acts that it is meant to punish
are extensively described within the decree it was passed under (El Peruano 2018). The institution
seems to be successful in part because of the two institutions that it formed from. The National
Criminal Chamber is in charge of categorizing crimes (those established in art. 3 under law N°
30077) while the Specialized System for Corruption Offenses of Officials recognizes how those
crimes have had national or international repercussions.
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This combining of institutions seems to have worked in their complex categorization of
crimes and their effects. Since its inception, the CSJ has been successful in its task of investigating
officials. The case of former President Alan Garcia suggests the effectiveness of the new court. On
April 16, 2019, the court ordered the preemptive arrest of Garcia as well as eight other officials on
charges of money laundering (CSJ 2019). In 2018, the court ordered for Kuczynski to complete
36 months of house arrest (as a substitute for preventive incarceration) while his involvement with
Odebrecht continues to be investigated (CSN 2019). The choice to give Kuczynski house arrest
was allowed given his age and health issues (La Ley 2019).
Financing
Another important element that supported the CSJ in its endeavors was the provisions it
received from the federal government and smaller contributions from other sources (Presupuesto
del Pliego Poder Judicial Año Fiscal 2018). Essentially, the manner in which the court receives
funding is determined by decrees passed by the government. For the most part, Peruvian courts
are allocated resources in this manner and the actual monetary funds come from the public sector
(Poder Judicial del Peru 2019). For example, according to the 2018 Institutional Opening Budget,
the estimated budget for Peruvian courts was S/. 2.272 billion soles, which roughly translates to
$670,000,000 USD. These funds are divided between sixteen jurisdictions and ten superior courts
(Poder Judicial del Peru 2018). The funding has continued into the 2020 budget and the CSJ has
established itself as worthy of financing as it has evidently held several officials accountable for
corrupt crimes.
It is interesting that congress under Kuczynski’s administration continued funding this
program despite several officials in his cabinet being implicated in the Odebrecht scandal, which
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has been claimed by some as the most expansive corruption crime of the century (Shiel & Chavkin
2019). The answer perhaps lies in Kuczynski’s incentives to keep the institution running. As
explained earlier in this chapter, Kuczynski’s entire cabinet was replaced after a vote of no
confidence and early on in his presidency his top picks for ministers and secretaries were linked
to crimes of corruption by opposition parties (El Diario 2017). This could be said to have given
Kuczynski a strong incentive to reduce corruption as a strong anti-corruption institution would
have helped give his administration more legitimacy.
Oversight
The CSJ is currently overseen by the president of the court and abides by the Single Ordered Text
of the Organic Law of the Judiciary. The current president of the CSJ is Dr. Inés Felipa Villa
Bonilla, who also acts as the superior judge of the court. According to Article 10 of the decree
found in El Peruano, the president of the court is in charge of overseeing the Superior Court (El
Peruano 2018). This oversight is independent from political influence as the president must be
elected, not appointed and this election is “subject to the provisions of the Organic Law of the
Judiciary”, a text developed by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (El Peruano 2018). The
Organic Law of the Judiciary details the guidelines that the justice system must abide by
(Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos 2012). The way in which the president is chosen is
of particular importance given it makes the institution’s head politically transparent, which allows
for accountability and an exposure of any political influence or affiliation that the CSJ’s head
might have.
The CSJ must also abide by the guidelines created by the Single Ordered Text of the
Organic Law of the Judiciary (SOT for short), also known as the Texto Unico Ordenado de la ley
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Organica del Poder Judicial. The SOT was created in 1993 and although courts are subject to its
advices, no other anti-corruption institutions (such as the CSJ) have had to follow its measures.
The SOT currently pushes for courts to remain autonomous from “political, administrative,
economic, and disciplinary influence. In addition, the SOT ensures that they are jurisdictionally
independent, subject to the Constitution and the present law” (El Peruano 1993). This is
particularly effective when compared to other anti-corruption mechanisms because this code
provides basic rules to follow and sets up a high level of independence which allows for greater
effectiveness (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018).
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OUTCOME EXPLANATION

As seen with the Toledo and Kuczynski case studies, both anti-corruption institutions were
created under different conditions and their success deviated because of the difference in relevance
of the three institutional pillars: their design, funding, and oversight mechanisms. Although the
pillars are analyzed on their own within specific sections, they must work together to create
effective ACAs.
Oversight Mechanisms
Both the CNA and the CSJ were created to fight corruption shortly after the corresponding
previous presidents were associated with crimes of grand corruption. Whether the institutions were
created for legitimate reasons or not, their success or lack thereof is the main focus of this thesis.
It can be noted however, that Kuczynski and Toledo differed in their incentives to support their
respective institutions. For example, while some scholars claim Toledo created his anti-corruption
commission to establish legitimacy (after the Fujimori presidency lowered levels of political trust),
Kuczynski created his anti-corruption court in order to fight accusations of corruption placed on
his cabinet (Carrión 2009; Pozsgai-Alvarez 2018).
While Toledo received little backlash from the opposition during his term, Kuczynski
constantly engaged in disputes with members of the opposition party, Popular Force, headed by
Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko Fujimori8 (Arce & Incio 2017). It was Fujimorists (the nickname given
to members of Popular Force that side with Fujimori) that initiated a vote of no confidence against

8

Keiko Fujimori was elected to congress in 2006 and as its head managed to enlarge her party’s seats.
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Kuczynski, his two impeachment trials, and later on secretly recorded him offering favors to
congressmembers in exchange for votes to not impeach (El Espectador 2018). It can be said that
the political climate made it easier for Toledo to shift his attention to other matters and eventually
dissolve his commission while for Kuczynski, his anti-corruption measures were seen as vital to
saving his presidency. The actions of these leaders demonstrate the relevance and importance of
having a leadership that supports institutions and works to promote accountability and public
integrity.
Design
The CNA’s responsibilities were never clearly defined, and the duties of its
president were unclear. To go further into detail, the decree that created the CNA’s czar, failed to
outline the duties he/she was supposed to fulfill and did not establish measures of accountability
to ensure the decisions made by the head were unaffected by political motives. Moreyra
Belaunde’s own appointment helps prove this point as he was unfairly appointed by Toledo. As
theory states, a comprehensive framework is important for the success of an ACA as it provides
accountability and prevents the institution from being dependent of other agencies. In contrast,
Kuczynski’s anti-corruption court was created under a detailed decree that outlines the duties the
institution is supposed to fulfill, the objectives and tasks of its president and guidelines that must
be followed. As the CNA case demonstrated, a lack of independence was detrimental as the
original intent of the commission became blurred and eventually the ACA was dismantled.
Funding
The funding of the institutions also differed, as the CNA was allocated funds that were
simply not appropriate for the national task it was created for and it never established a formal
budget. Whereas the CSJ continues to receive a steady funding and is part of a budget of about

39

$600 million USD, the CNA during its first year received a mere $330 thousand USD as its first
disbursement with the payments that followed scheduled irregularly (PCM 2006). This disparity
in funding suggests that careful management of financial resources are crucial for an ACA to work
effectively to deter and counter the beneficiaries of corruption. In the case of the CNA, the funding
was simply not enough to curb corruption of officials within the institution itself.
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CONCLUSION

The research presented here supports the thesis’ initial hypothesis. The current anticorruption institution is more effective than the one created during the Toledo administration. The
institutional pillars of the ACAs in question demonstrate as seen by the empirical observations,
that it is necessary to have proportional and independent financing relative to the responsibilities
an institution is built to fulfill. With reference to oversight, it has been demonstrated that it is
crucial to receive support from the executive. Additionally, a clear design and proper guideline
must be present in order for an ACA to keep its independence and maintain a clear objective.
The CSJ serves as proof that efforts by the government to curb corruption can be successful
at holding corrupt officials accountable. In Kuczysnki’s case, it was favorable for him to roll out
anti-corruption measures, making it easier for the institution to succeed. The CSJ’s objectives have
been very clear since its inception and many of its goals have been met. The opposite can be said
of the CNA, which was ultimately dismantled by its own creators.
Finally, it can also be concluded that although the CSJ has been successful in charging
presidents and other high-ranked officials on money laundering and grand corruption crimes, this
does not necessarily mean institutions in Peru are becoming stronger. Rather, this demonstrates
that the political environment of Peru can change from administration to administration and it is
with the help and support of the executive that institutions such as the CSJ can forge a path towards
success. Currently, this appears to be the case as the CSJ continues to operate and is conducting
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ongoing investigations on both former President Alejandro Toledo and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.
The new President Martin Vizcarra (Independent Party), who took office after Kuczynski stepped
down, has continued to support the anti-corruption institutions created by the previous presidency
(OCCRP 2019). Most recently, Vizcarra has called for a constitutional referendum banning private
financing of political campaigns to reduce corruption crimes (NCLA 2019). Additionally, in
January 2020, Vizcarra dissolved congress with the support of the Constitutional Court and
replaced many of the politicians involved in political graft (OCCRP 2019). Although immediate
results cannot accurately be analyzed nor will they be visible, these efforts have been commended
by many scholars and governments alike as they have demonstrated their effectiveness in helping
Peruvian agencies provide accountability.
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